Introduction
There is no shortage of studies on the determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI).
Likewise, a huge body of literature exists on the economic effects of regional integration agreements (RIAs) on both member countries and non-members. Both issues are not only of academic interest, but figure high on the political agenda almost everywhere in the world.
Policymakers fiercely compete for FDI inflows which are widely believed to promote economic growth in the host countries. RIAs have mushroomed, partly because multilateral integration has been stalled, e.g., in the WTO context.
As matter of fact, RIAs are considered a means to improve member countries' chances to attract FDI. RIAs affect several factors on the list of possible FDI determinants, including effective market size, economic growth and trade costs. 1 According to Brenton et al. (1999: 95) , "recent evidence suggests that regional economic integration provides an important stimulus not only to trade, but also to FDI." But it also appears that high expectations have often not been met. UNCTAD (1998: 118) notes "the failure of numerous regional integration frameworks in the 1960s and 1970s to exert any discernable influence on transnational corporations."
Most probably, both FDI and RIAs are too diverse to allow for generalized verdicts regarding the effects of RIAs on FDI flows to member countries. FDI may respond differently depending on its source (within or outside the integration scheme) as well as its motive (e.g., market-seeking or efficiency-seeking). A host of specific characteristics may determine whether, to which extent and where exactly an integration scheme has the desired effects on FDI; e.g., membership (North-South or South-South integration), the type of integration (institutionalized or market-driven), its degree on paper (ranging from free-trade area to common market) as well as in actual practice (implementation deficits), and the treatment of outsiders (fortress or open regionalism).
Against this backdrop, we take a fairly modest approach in the following. After shortly expanding on the just mentioned ambiguities in Section 2, we turn to four major examples of South-South integration schemes in Section 3. We focus on the Mercado Común del Sur (Mercosur) in Latin America, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Asia, and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Africa. These integration schemes have in common that they are of major relevance in the particular region as well as for economic partner countries in the North. At the same time, these four cases reveal a high degree of diversity and sometimes offer different answers to our questions of major interest: Has FDI increased due to regional integration? Have all members benefited from higher FDI? Has outward FDI by major players in the region contributed to effective integration?
Analytical and Empirical Ambiguities
It is for several reasons that the effects of regional integration on FDI are hard to predict. First of all, RIAs differ in various respects. Some of them are mainly market-driven, involving a minor degree of institutionalization. Regional integration in Asia is often considered to be of this type (Langhammer 2007) . At the same time, institutionalized integration varies not only in terms of degree or depth, i.e, whether members are part of a free trade area, customs union or common market, but also in the extent to which formal agreements are actually implemented (see also UNCTAD 1998: 118-119) . Deeper institutionalized integration has not necessarily stronger FDI effects, especially if institutionalization is largely on paper only. The discussion of Mercosur and ASEAN below provides insights in this regard.
The heterogeneity of FDI is equally important. Most obviously, regional integration may have varying effects on FDI coming from other member countries or non-members, with net effects hard to quantify. Regional integration may also have opposing effects on different types of FDI. The differentiation between market-seeking and efficiency-seeking remains useful in this context, even though the typology of FDI has become increasingly complex.
The former type of FDI is motivated essentially by serving the local market of the host country or region, involving a horizontal replication of similar production lines in different locations. The latter vertical type of FDI is motivated by international cost differentials and involves slicing up the value chain through relocating specific stages of the production process to where they are most cost effective to undertake. 2 The horizontal type of FDI tends to dominate when relative factor endowments and, thus, relative prices are similar in the home and the host country, whereas the incentive to undertake vertical FDI increases when relative factor endowments vary (Carr et al. 2001 ).
We do not attempt to provide a comprehensive categorization of either RIAs or FDI.
Rather, the subsequent discussion is meant to exemplify the analytical ambiguity concerning the effects of RIAs on FDI, by referring to selected transmission channels which may have opposing effects. 3 The most obvious aspect of regional integration consists of removing or, at least, lowering internal trade barriers within the integration scheme. Trade costs tend to encourage horizontal FDI, while discouraging vertical FDI (Carr et al. 2001) . Consequently, this measure alone may have several FDI effects working in different directions.
Concerning intra-regional FDI, the removal of internal trade barriers reduces FDI of the horizontal (or market-seeking) type by weakening the incentive of companies based within the integration scheme to use FDI as a tariff-jumping device. 4 Exports, which were no reasonable option as long as trade barriers were high, may now substitute for FDI in order to serve the markets of partner countries and realize economies of scale by producing at home.
On the other hand, intra-regional FDI of the vertical type may be stimulated by the removal of internal trade barriers. This applies especially to RIAs whose member countries are at different stages of economic development. Cost differentials within the RIA may then strengthen the incentive of companies to engage in intra-regional vertical specialization by undertaking efficiency-seeking FDI.
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In contrast to intra-regional FDI of the horizontal type, horizontal FDI from sources outside the region may be stimulated by the removal of trade barriers within the RIA. This is because effective market size increases. An external investor may now locate production facilities in one member country of the RIA and serve the local markets of several or all member countries from there. FDI of this sort, so-called export platforms within a RIA, would result in overall higher extra-regional FDI if RIA members had not attracted FDI from this investor before. However, the establishment of export platforms may also result in overall lower extra-regional FDI if the investor had established production facilities in several member countries before and now "rationalizes" her regional production network (Altomonte 2007; Te Velde and Bezemer 2006) .
Consequently, as mentioned by Levy Yeyati et al. (2003: 10) , "within the RIA, there may be winners and losers." Previously existing FDI stocks may be relocated in favor of some members, and at the expense of others. 6 UNCTAD (1998: 120) notes that it is not necessarily the larger member countries that benefit. Rather, with local market size becoming less relevant, cost-effective locations in small member countries may have better chances to attract 3 For a more comprehensive discussion of possible FDI effects of regional integration, see Blomström and Kokko (1997) as well as Blomström et al. (2000) . 4 See Levy Yeyati et al. (2003) and Altomonte (2007) for further discussion of "tariff-jumping" FDI. 5 See also Helpman (1984) . Levy Yeyati et al. (2003) find empirical support for a positive relationship between differences in factor endowments and FDI. 6 Baltagi et al. (2007) focus on third-country effects and the re-allocation of FDI across host countries, e.g., when new members enter a regional integration scheme. (Levy Yeyati et al. 2003) . But the effects are not necessarily restricted to intraregional FDI. Te Velde and Bezemer (2006) argue that the investment provisions of some RIAs apply to outsiders, too, so that extra-regional FDI may also increase.
Finally, the links between regional integration and FDI may be complicated by various dynamic effects. Most importantly perhaps, regional integration may have a lasting positive effect on FDI inflows to the extent that integration promotes economic growth (Blomström and Kokko 1997) . The consequences of other dynamic effects are more difficult to predict.
For instance, a higher degree of competition in more integrated markets -which may actually be the result of more FDI -may discourage further FDI if domestic firms are now more efficient and, thus, able to outcompete foreign newcomers.
All this implies that it is almost impossible to isolate the effects of regional integration on FDI, including the effects working rather indirectly. Some countries entered into regional integration schemes to "lock in" non-binding (unilateral) reform measures undertaken 7 The case of Ireland may be noted in this context. 8 De Sousa and Lochard (2004) analyze the effects of a currency union on trade with respect to the EMU experience. According to their results, the common currency significantly increased trade through a rise in FDI.
before. 9 In such cases, it may be particularly difficult to credit either the unilateral reforms or regional integration for subsequent increases in FDI inflows. More generally, FDI effects tend to result from the interplay of regional integration and country-specific factors. According to Blomström and Kokko (1997) , the impact of a RIA on FDI in a particular member country is most likely to be pronouncedly positive if (i) the degree of integration is high and (ii) the particular country enjoys strong locational advantages.
In the light of the analytical complexity concerning the effects of regional integration on FDI, it is not really surprising that policymakers are looking for obvious empirical models to make their case for RIAs among emerging economies. The EU represents the model most often referred to, and the consensus view appears to be that it was successful not least in terms of attracting FDI (Dunning 1997; Baltagi et al. 2007 ). Yet the EU's success has to be qualified in several respects, and its model character is open to question. The coincidence of EU deepening and rising FDI inflows does not necessarily imply that the former has caused the latter. According to Dunning (1997) , almost intractable conceptual and data problems stand in the way of isolating the effects of regional integration on FDI flows. As mentioned before, the impact is rather indirect, e.g., working through economic growth and the regulatory framework. The counterfactual, i.e., growth and regulations without integration, is typically unknown. Hence, Dunning (1997: 209) concludes that it is "of questionable value" to consider the Internal Market Program (or any other integration step, for that matter) "as an independent variable."
In summary, it is not only due to analytical complexity but also to ambivalent empirical evidence with respect to the most advanced (and researched) integration scheme, the EU, that it is almost impossible to come up with clear-cut and generalized predictions concerning the effects on FDI of major integration schemes among emerging economies.
Therefore, we turn to selected case studies in the following.
Four Major Cases a. Overview
In the following, we present stylized facts and discuss the related literature for four regional The link between regional integration and FDI has been widely debated in Latin America.
Mexico's integration into NAFTA in 1993 and the associated boom of FDI flows to Mexico have received particular attention (e.g. Kose et al. 2004; Tekin-Koru and Waldkirch 2008 ).
Waldkirch (2003) concludes: "Had NAFTA not been formed, FDI from these countries (i.e., the United States and Canada) would have been as much as 45 % lower since 1994."
Compared to NAFTA effects on Mexico's attractiveness to FDI, a rather ambiguous picture prevails with respect to Mercosur, in terms of both overall attractiveness to FDI and the distribution of FDI among member countries. According to UNCTAD (1998: 126) , "it is not obvious how far FDI gains have been the direct outcome of Mercosur." Blomström and Kokko (1997) point to significant changes in trade and investment rules in the region that should have resulted in relatively strong FDI effects for Mercosur as a whole. In the light of unilateral liberalization as well as multilateral commitments, however, "it is uncertain how much of the reforms should be credited to the formal integration agreement" (ibid: 33). Developments at the level of individual Mercosur member countries underscore that regional integration has been just one, and possibly even a minor factor driving FDI inflows.
Argentina provides the most obvious case in point. High FDI inflows in the 1990s had the effect that Argentina's share in FDI stocks of Mercosur doubled to almost 40 %; in per-capita terms, FDI stocks in 2000 were about three times higher in Argentina than in Brazil (Table 2) .
But the whole period of observation was characterized by erratic FDI developments in Argentina. As concerns Brazil, a survey conducted by UNCTAD (2000) reveals that the regional effect was marginal for TNCs' decisions on investing there.
Any sustained effects of Mercosur integration were clearly dominated by countryspecific boom and bust phenomena. 16 The exceptionally large privatization-related FDI inflows in 1999 are just one example. Likewise, "regular" FDI (i.e., subtracting FDI due to privatizations and debt conversions) accounted for just 12 % of total FDI inflows in 1991-1993 -i.e., immediately after the creation of Mercosur (Inter-American Development Bank and IRELA 1996: 48). Recently, any integration-related gains in attractiveness were wiped out completely by the financial crisis and Argentina's volte-face concerning the role of FDI in privatizations.
Insert Table 2 . 16 Concerning developments up to the mid-1990s, Blomström and Kokko (1997: 38) conclude that (countryspecific) macroeconomic stabilization was more important for FDI inflows than regional integration.
At the same time, Mercosur integration on the FDI attractiveness of its members are unlikely to materialize before narrowing the wide gap between the rhetoric about integration and actual practice. Devlin and Ffrench-Davis (1999: 277) stress that the effects of regional integration critically depend on whether agreements are implemented fully and enforced effectively.
Mercosur has not been particularly successful in this regard. Preusse (2001: 930) argues that the integration process has virtually come to a standstill in the second half of the 1990s:
"Neither a consistent macroeconomic concept exists within the region nor is there a reliable framework for the establishment of a more intense (market oriented) intra-regional specialization." Member countries repeatedly erected trade barriers against each other on an ad-hoc basis. 17 Rather than deepening integration, it appears that the customs union "is getting more imperfect over time" (The Economist December 9 th , 2004).
There are, however, a number of recent regional initiatives which raise new hope for a deeper de facto integration within Mercosur. According to UNCTAD (2007c), important initiatives, e.g. in the energy, infrastructure and automotive sectors, have eased cross-border transactions and led to more integrated production schemes between the member countries.
c. Asean and China: Can Do without Formal Integration?
In contrast to Mercosur, ASEAN attracted an almost constant share of FDI stocks located in all developing countries (Table 1) Insert Table 3 somewhere here
The relevance of country-specific factors is also evident when looking at longer-term trends concerning the three heavyweights within ASEAN, each of which accounted for 25-28% of ASEAN's total FDI stocks in 1980 (Table 3) China may thus be regarded as a "push factor" that brought forward ASEAN integration by provoking fears of FDI diversion (Ariff 2006 (Pangestu 2004) . 22 We do not discuss data deficiencies in any detail here, but more specific information is available from the authors on request. 23 Buckley et al. (2007) analyze the driving forces of Chinese OFDI more systematically, employing data from the State Authority of Foreign Exchange. They find outflows to be significantly correlated with cultural and geographical proximity, the host country's degree of political liberalization, its endowment with natural resources, and its market size. They did not include membership in an RTA as a separate FDI determinant. 24 The FTA between China and Thailand, together with the provision of infrastructure by the Thai government, has promoted FDI especially in Northern Thailand (Frost 2004 ).
According to Frost (2004) , China ranks among the five most important investors in Viet Nam, and also in minor ASEAN host countries such as Cambodia. 25 Indeed, this author observed that Chinese OFDI has triggered a change in the mindset of top politicians with regard to regionalization, e.g., in Malaysia. China is viewed no longer as a threat, but rather as offering promising market opportunities, and ASEAN countries are eager to pull in Chinese FDI (Chia and Sussangkarn 2006) . At the same time, the Chinese government actively aims to increase cooperation and investment in ASEAN, especially in sectors such as the biotech industry and electronic information. In this way, China seeks access to advanced technologies that are available in ASEAN countries (Chia and Sussangkarn 2006; Ping 2007) . Table 1 and Figure 4) . Moreover, the increase in SAPTA was seen as a temporary agreement to be replaced by the South Asian Free Trade 27 See Jayasuriya and Weerakoon (2002) Agreement (SAFTA), which went into force in 2006. It was hoped that SAFTA will bring the intended surge in intra-regional FDI which has been missing since SAARC was set up 30 .
However, Iyengar (2007) points to a lack of political will to encourage more intensive Sudan. Apart from a few resource-rich countries, Indian OFDI is generally rather oriented towards developed economies. Pradhan (2007) shows that acquisitions by Indian multinationals have a strong market-seeking motivation. Consequently, the market size of the host economies (both by population and per-capita GDP) plays an important role in attracting Indian acquisitions, just like a large and skilled pool of labor. This explains the attractiveness of developed countries for Indian OFDI and represents a significant difference to Chinese OFDI which is more oriented towards developing countries.
33 30 Article 8h of SAFTA includes the "removal of barriers to intra-SAARC investments." 31 APTA includes Bangladesh, China, India, Republic of Korea, Lao People's Democratic Republic, and Sri Lanka. 32 Comprising Thailand, Myanmar and all SAARC members with the exception of Afghanistan, the Maldives, and Pakistan. 33 The Business Line asserts on June 22, 2006, that "India went global to pitch for a bigger stake in the world knowledge-based industry market, unlike China, which sought to establish its brand image for manufacturing products and to feed its hunger for resources."
The geographical distribution of Indian OFDI within SAARC is displayed in Figure 5 .
Sri Lanka attracts the lion's share with over 50% of total stocks, while Nepal accounts for almost a third. Looking at the source-country break-down of inflows to different SAARC countries, Sahoo (2006) finds that only Nepal seems to be heavily dependent on Indian FDI.
In most other countries (including Sri Lanka) inflows from developed countries play a more important role. Not surprisingly, Indian OFDI stocks in BIMSTEC and APTA countries developed largely parallel to the stocks in SAARC (Figure 6 ). Membership patterns overlap,
with Sri Lanka playing a key role as a host of Indian OFDI stocks also in BIMSTEC and APTA.
Insert Figures 5+6 somewhere here
In contrast, OFDI to ASEAN and ASEAN+3 increased a lot more in recent years,
represented by a stock of around US$ 1.1 and 1.3 billion respectively, in comparison to a stock below US$ 300 million in SAARC. Indian investments in the small city state of Singapore alone more than double the stock of OFDI in all SAARC countries together. of FDI stocks in all developing countries declined substantially over the last decades (see Table 1 ). SADC performed hardly better than the rest of Africa in attracting FDI; its average Moreover, the government of the RSA decided to join the WTO, TRIPS and TRIMS agreements which increased the trust in the new policy regime. RSA being the major player in Southern Africa, the reforms increased the FDI attractiveness of the region as a whole.
Although the resource-seeking type of FDI plays an important role in Southern Africa, Jenkins and Thomas (2002) show that the size of the local market is the main motivation for investors in SADC. 37 These authors argue that a "functioning and sustainable free trade area is more likely to offer the economies of scale required for investment to be profitable and thus should encourage more direct investment in the region" (Jenkins and Thomas 2002: 44) .
Consequently, one might have expected a rise in FDI inflows in connection with the signing of the Trade Protocol, if foreign investors considered the envisaged integration steps to be credible.
36 See Goldstein (2003) for further discussion on such projects. 37 According to their survey of 81 enterprises, the market-seeking motivation was by far the most important determinant for multinationals (68%), followed by the availability of natural resources (32%). This is accentuated by the fact that 70% of the multinationals that are active in SADC have established subsidiaries in the RSA and serve the local and foreign market from this destination.
A number of explanations have been offered in the literature as to why anticipation effects have not been visible so far. One factor that may upset potential investors is the overlapping membership pattern between the various RIAs in sub-Saharan Africa 38 . Yet the majority view blames obstacles associated with an adverse business climate and high costs of doing business. Specific factors mentioned in this context include macroeconomic instability, the weak regulatory framework, slow progress of structural reforms, and lack of skills 39 and infrastructure (Goldstein 2003) . Jenkins and Thomas (2002) point to foreign exchange availability, exchange rate volatility and quality of governance as the most common risk factors. This list can be extended by various commonly perceived problems like the high incidence of corruption, crime and HIV/AIDS.
By now almost every SADC member has set up an investment promotion agency offering investor services and policy advocacy to facilitate doing business for foreign investors (Goldstein 2003) . This may represent a step towards improved regulatory quality in SADC which, according to Wolf (2002) , is required for regional integration to result in higher by Jenkins and Thomas (2002) , or divert FDI from other SADC countries? Considering 38 According to Thomas (2004: 12) , "conflicting memberships of regional economic agreements create uncertainty and increase the resources required for cooperation." 39 Goldstein (2003) also points to brain drain in Southern Africa leading to the emigration of the higher-skilled labor force to the United States, United Kingdom and other Commonwealth states, which distracts FDI to other developing regions. 40 AGOA was signed in 2000 by the United States and 39 sub-Saharan countries including all SADC members except Zimbabwe. It aims at improving economic ties and enhancing African exports to the United States by expanding market access for certain products, e.g. textiles. 41 Angola pulls in mainly resource-seeking FDI due to its abundance in natural resources such as oil and gas (Goldstein 2003 Insert Table 4 somewhere here
Summary and Conclusions
It is probably not by pure coincidence that RIAs have mushroomed while policymakers around the world fiercely compete for FDI inflows. RIAs are often considered a means to improve member countries' attractiveness to FDI. This is even though the links between regional integration and FDI are highly complex analytically, and previous empirical evidence is less straightforward than policymakers make us believe.
Both RIAs and FDI are too diverse to allow for any generalized verdicts concerning the effects of regional integration on FDI flows to member countries. Our four case studies on Mercosur, ASEAN, SAARC and SADC clearly reveal that it depends on various factors, some of which are at best loosely related to regional integration, whether high expectations will be met. RIAs differ with respect to the degree of institutionalization, and it cannot even be taken for granted that RIAs with more developed institutions are more successful in attracting FDI than RIAs that are rather market-driven. A loosely defined cooperation scheme may have stronger effects than an officially declared common market if the latter suffers from serious implementation deficits. The degree of openness of RIAs towards outsiders is likely to affect the type of FDI from extra-regional sources, with uncertain effects on overall inflows.
Furthermore, it is almost impossible to isolate the FDI effects of regional integration.
On the one hand, effects may be underestimated by looking at FDI developments only after the conclusion of RIAs -e.g., if credible policy announcements lead to anticipation effects.
On the other hand, regional integration often goes hand in hand with unilateral liberalization, which may be the ultimate reason of a country's improved attractiveness to FDI. And finally, the data situation leaves much to be desired, notably with regard to outward FDI activities in neighboring countries by major regional players such as Brazil, China, India and the Rep. of South Africa.
Against this backdrop, it is not really surprising that the four case studies provide just tentative answers to the three major questions addressed in this paper. First, it appears that country-specific factors were often more important as a stimulus to FDI than regional integration viewed in isolation. National boom and bust phenomena played a particularly important role in Mercosur. FDI trends for the heavyweights in ASEAN diverged markedly.
India experienced substantial FDI inflows after domestic economic reforms. Similarly, increasing FDI to SADC members in the late 1990s is commonly ascribed to liberalization and privatization policies.
Second, the distribution of FDI within regional integration schemes tends to support the skeptical view that RIA members are unlikely to equally share FDI-related benefits. At the same time, however, the larger and richer members are not necessarily the winners taking all.
In per-capita terms, Uruguay's attractiveness to FDI hardly trailed Brazil's. Several small ASEAN members outperformed larger partner countries once FDI is related to country size.
In South Asia, the FDI boom in India has little to do with RIA-induced concentration.
Third, the deficient data situation cautions against strong conclusions concerning the role of the four regional heavyweights in promoting effective regional integration through outward FDI in neighboring countries. Indications are, however, that one should not expect too much (Table 4 ). The intra-regional share of outward FDI by Brazil, China, India and the Republic of South Africa does not appear to be on an upward trend, even though the starting point typically was fairly low. This is not to ignore that the RSA, for instance, represented an important source of FDI from the perspective of some SADC partners; the same applies to Brazilian FDI in Paraguay or Indian investments in Nepal.
In the end, outward FDI from these regional heavyweights is likely to resemble FDI from more traditional sources in that it is driven by various motives. Current examples include: Brazil's tax-induced FDI directed to or through offshore financial centers; China's resource-seeking FDI in sub-Saharan Africa; and India's asset-and market-seeking FDI in highly developed host countries such as the United States. Market-seeking and efficiencyseeking FDI in neighboring countries, induced by regional integration, may gain in relative importance as the European example suggests. However, this requires sound implementation of RIAs in the first place. Moreover, regional integration is most likely to remain just one reason to undertake outward FDI. Note: flows to offshore financial centres have been excluded from totals. Source: UNCTAD FDI/TNC Database; Te Velde and Page (2004) 
Source: UNCTAD FDI/TNC Database

